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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal under to Utah Code Annotated § 
78-2-2(4) pursuant to an Order of the Utah Supreme Court dated October 4, 2002. This 
appeal was originally filed with the Utah Supreme Court under to Utah Code Annotated § 
78-2-2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendant-Appellee Board of County Commissioners of Utah County ("Utah 
County" or "County") generally accepts Evans's statement of issues and that "[t]he 
ultimate determination of whether an easement exists is a conclusion of law," subject to 
review under the correction of error standard. Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, ^ [11, 37 
P.2d 1112. 
However, the existence of an easement is also a highly fact-dependent 
question; therefore, [appellate courts] accord the trial judge a measure of 
discretion when applying the correct legal standard to the facts, and 
overturn a ruling concerning the existence of an easement only if the judge 
exceeded the discretion granted. 
Id 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff-Appellant Jamie Evans purchased property used primarily for mining in 
Utah County, Utah, in 1996. The property borders a platted but undeveloped subdivision. 
(R. at 210, 212, 228-29, 255, 386, 415-16.) Evans brought this suit to challenge a Utah 
County ordinance that vacated three of the "paper streets" (streets that, although platted 
and dedicated, have never been developed or used) within the subdivision, claiming that, 
inter alia, the vacations destroyed potential access routes to his property. (R. at 9-17, 
1 
279, 476/62.) Evans contemporaneously sought to enforce a reservation included in a 
quit-claim deed of the prior owner that attempted to reserve a right of way through one of 
the platted streets (Pine Street) and over a 120-foot strip to the south for access, and to 
compel Utah County to build a gravel road within a fifty-six foot wide right of way across 
the 120-foot strip. (R. at 9-17, 206, 214, 216, 223-26, 241, 256-57, 278-79, 422-23.) 
Evans filed a Complaint against Utah County approximately a month after the 
enactment of the vacating ordinance, on November 27, 1996, and an Amended Complaint 
on February 5, 1997, challenging the vacation ordinance, claiming deprivation of due 
process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and breach of contract, and seeking declaratory judgment 
recognizing the alleged easement the prior owner attempted to reserve. (R. at 1-17, 422.) 
The trial court granted Utah County's motion for summary judgment in a ruling on 
July 1, 2002, entering an order dismissing Evans's suit with prejudice on July 31, 2002. 
(R. at 431-46, 449-63.) This appeal followed. Although Evans's Docketing Statement 
raised an issue regarding the trial court's dismissal of his challenge to the vacation 
ordinance, his brief ignores that issue, leaving only two issues related to his claim for a 
declaration recognizing his alleged easement for this Court's review. (Dock. Stmt, at 2-
3.) 
Facts 
In February, 1926, Knight Investment Company ("Knight") recorded the Ironton 
Plat, mapping a planned subdivision of property located south of Provo, Utah, in Utah 
County. (R. at 279.) Knight included in the plat, and dedicated for public use, Harvard, 
Yale, Princeton, Walnut, Naples, Dupont, and Pine Streets as they appear on the map 
included in Appellee's Addendum ("Map"). (Aplee's Add. at Al.) These streets existed 
only on paper, and were drawn over terrain with steep average grades, ranging from eight 
2 
to eighteen percent (the average Pine Street grade was eighteen percent), sloping up from 
the west toward the east.1 These grades would have been the same in 1983, when Bird 
quit-claimed lots within the Ironton Plat to Utah County. (R. at 258-59, 390-91, 417-19.) 
In 1935, Utah County and the Colorado Development Company conveyed land they 
owned near or within the Ironton Plat to the State of Utah to be included in the 
development of a newly aligned state highway, Highway 89, which appears as the "State 
Road" bounding the west side of the plat, its extension demonstrated on the Map by dash 
marks. (R. at 218, 279.) Access to Evans's property from Highway 89 exists south of the 
Ironton Plat. (R. at 476/62.) 
Nearly fifty years later, on July 9, 1983, the R.L. Bird Company ("Bird") delivered 
a Quit-claim Deed ("1983 Deed") to Utah County conveying lots it owned within the 
Ironton Plat to accommodate the County's construction of a new public works building 
located between where Walnut and Naples Streets are platted on the Map. By that same 
instrument, the County also acquired a 120' x 760' strip of land on the southeastern 
boundary of the Ironton Plat. The lots conveyed appear on the Map in yellow, and the 
strip of land is outlined on the Map in green. (R. at 214, 216, 218, 241, 243, 257-59, 388-
89, 420-21; Aplee's Add. at A1-A2.) This land provided additional parking space and 
room for acceleration and deceleration lanes along realigned Highway 89, allowing the 
County to obtain a permit from the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) for a new 
access off the highway into the parking lot that services the public works building. (R. at 
214, 216, 218, 241, 243, 257-59, 388-89, 420-21.) Utah County completed the public 
works facility, which included a building, a service station, and a parking lot, in January, 
1986. To facilitate the improvements, a large amount of material was removed from the 
1
 Evans disputed the relevance of these facts below, but not the correctness of the facts 
themselves. 
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hillside at the westerly end of where Walnut, Naples, Dupont, and Pine Streets were 
platted. (R. at 208, 255, 422; Aplee's Add. at Al.) Bird did not file a lawsuit challenging 
the 1986 regrading project. (R. at 390.) 
The 1983 Deed also contained a reservation, drafted by Bird, providing as follows: 
RESERVING to the grantor the public use and right-of-way over and into 
Pine Street from the State Highway and a 56' wide right-of-way over and 
across the last described parcel of land [the 120' x 760' strip referred to in 
the foregoing paragraph], from Pine Street to connect with the grantor's 
remaining property over which Utah County agrees to build a good gravel 
road within 90 days of the date of this instrument, to provide access to 
grantor's remaining land. 
(Aplee's Add. at A2.) Evans has presented no evidence showing that the County assented 
to this easement. In fact, county commission minutes refer to the county engineer's 
statement that "this reservation was unilateral and never accepted by the County." (R. at 
138.) As a result of the 1983 conveyance, Bird no longer owned land abutting Pine 
Street, which terminated on its west end in Highway 89 and on its east end in Bird's 
property. (Aplee's Add. at Al.) In 1983, there was no access onto Pine Street from 
Highway 89 due to the steepness of the Pine Street right of way and because the state had 
acquired the west end of Pine Street and adjoining properties as part of the Highway 89 
realignment project, completed in 1979.2 As of this date, UDOT has not approved any 
application for access to Highway 89 from Pine Street. (R. at 218, 243, 245, 247-48, 250-
51,257-59,391,417-20.) 
The road mentioned in the reservation was never built, the stated right of way 
never used, nor were any of the platted streets opened, used, or improved, except for Yale 
2
 Utah County development standards limit the slope of roads to eight percent. (R. at 
250-51, 258-59, 390-91, 417-19.) 
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Street, which the county maintained, but did not open. An unimproved road was 
developed approximately seventy-five feet east of the platted position of Columbia 
Avenue. (R. at 212, 231, 233, 235-36, 238-39, 250-51, 255-56, 258-59, 387-88, 391, 
416-19, 476/45 & /46; Aplee's Add. at Al.) 
On November 27, 1995, Bird conveyed a portion of its property to Jamie D. Evans 
and Terry D. Evans.3 The property conveyed is generally located south and east of the 
Ironton Plat and outside where Pine Street is platted, and is indicated by the area filled 
with red diagonal lines on the Map. (R. at 210, 212, 228-29, 255, 386, 415-16; Aplee's 
Add.atAl.)4 
Approximately a year later, on October 29, 1996, Utah County vacated by 
ordinance portions of the Ironton Plat, including Walnut, Naples, and Dupont Streets. 
Pine Street was not vacated. (R. at 206, 210, 220-21, 223-26, 254-55, 385, 414-15, 423.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court properly held that the reservation of easement made by Bird in the 
1983 deed is unenforceable. Bird's reservation of a private easement in that document 
fails for at least three reasons. First, because Pine Street only existed on paper at the time 
Bird made his reservation, he had no private easement over the street and therefore could 
The trial court found that Terry Evans was an indispensable party to this action, and the 
parties stipulated at the oral argument on the County's motion for summary judgment that 
Evans would amend his Amended Complaint to include her as a plaintiff. (R. at 476/4.) 
Evans has not done so. Utah County assumes that Evans's failure to do so is merely an 
oversight, and proceeds under the belief that the Court's determination of this appeal will 
apply with equal force to both Jamie and Terry Evans. If it will not, Utah County 
requests the Court dismiss this appeal for Evans's failure to join an indispensable party, 
contrary to his stipulation before the trial court. 
4
 The county engineer, disputing Evans's contrary statement, again reexamined the 
Ironton Plat and reaffirmed his prior conclusion that the property Bird conveyed to Evans 
lies entirely outside the Pine Street right of way. (R. at 386.) 
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not reserve it. Second, Bird's reservation violates the Statute of Frauds because it fails to 
sufficiently describe the easement. Finally, the language of the easement was too vague 
to allow the trial court to fix its location. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT NO PRIVATE 
EASEMENT EXISTED FOR EVANS'S PREDECESSOR TO RESERVE. 
Evans disputes the trial court's holding that "the Supreme Court of Utah has 
established that private easements over public ways are created only when those public 
ways physically existed at the time the landowner acquired the property." (Aplt's Add. at 
12.) Evans's sole argument against the trial court's decision is that it misapprehended 
Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, 37 P.3d 1112, which, he argues, instead held that a 
public way need only appear on a map for abutting owners to acquire a private easement 
right over it. (Aplt's Br. at 8-10.) Evans construes Carrier too narrowly. 
While Evans does not dispute that "a grantee may receive only what a grantor has 
to give," Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1952), he contends that Bird possessed 
a private easement over Pine Street under his interpretation of Carrier. Thus, he argues, 
because "Utah law clearly provides that private rights of way and easements over a public 
way shall not be impaired when that way is vacated by the governing body," Carrier, 
2001 UT 105, <P3, 37 P.3d 1112, a point Utah County does not dispute, the private 
easement Bird reserved still exists. (Aplt's Br. at 8-10.) But a closer reading of Carrier 
demonstrates that a street's physical existence is a threshold determination when deciding 
whether a private easement has been created. 
In Carrier, it was undisputed that the alley at issue existed both physically and on a 
plat map. See id. at ffl[2-8. One of the questions the case presented was whether the 
plaintiffs, who purchased their property after the street was improperly vacated, could 
6 
claim a private easement over the street by asserting reliance on ;nc sircei .ippearaiice 
i •*.:*; *)h 'Nirch.i^ ed their property ' Set - • f*{* I he .ourt 
deiermined iho nand* and i vans ciio nwiii. that part of the i-~ ^^- . /. 
atf1fl.2 15;(Aplt'sBr.at9) • -
I lie defendants in Carrier responded to that arpunx... -: ^ :.-.. . _ n 
Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 126 P 4S9 (I Hah 1912), the plat map's erroneous description ^ the 
alley as vacated when the plamtitls purchaser ;IK > p: . ^  y 
on i-e ^a^ t^  subsequently claim an easement <>\er the aiie\ in Tuttle. the plain 
sought .Mi.- v^.t .Jci*.vw. iiuji;i,.:. i * 1 :i cavemen 
appeared on a pin mup h»*- had been statutoriK abandoned by the time they purcn<t 
their abutting pi open;, v .*..*•. , 
the facts presented by Carrier: 
the avenue in 2 wtf/e had been fenced off and la.ndseapedl and did not exist as 
a road at the time plaintiff purchased his property. In fact, the avenue had 
never been used as a public highway and had been vacated and legally 
abandoned for over ten years. In this case, by contrast, the alley had been 
open for public use for over a hundred years and had not been legally 
vacated at the time plaintiffs purchased their homes. At the time of 
defendants' purchase, and up until defendants obstructed the alley, plaintiffs 
openly and consistently used the alley to access their properties. 
Carrier, 20(31 11 I' 105, !]I ^  3~ P.3d 1112 (citations omitted) (emphases added). In other 
words, jllliotiyli I'lit" pLH iv plaintiffs llial Ik." allev had been vacated, the 
fact that the alley existed and was used as an alley allowed them to assert, their c laii ii In 
^though flic [J'liil map depicts Pine Street, il is undisputed that it has 
never been opened, used, nor developed, and that il has been partially excavated and 
piiMulfisapailmi^Ml \H " 7. ^<> ^7-78, Wl, 416-20, 476/45 &/46.) ^usEvans 
is precluded from now asserting an easement over it, 
7 
Evans's interpretation of Carrier would also contradict longstanding Utah law, 
much of which the supreme court relied upon in Carrier. See, e.g., Mason v. Utah, 656 
P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1982) ("[A]n abutting landowner has a private easement of ingress 
and egress to existing public highways." (emphasis added)); Tuttle, 126 P. at 963 ("So far, 
the matter is clear enough that the right of the abutting owner is based upon something 
that is tangible, and which exists at the time he purchased the property." (emphasis 
added)). 
Therefore, because Bird did not have a private easement in Pine Street, it could not 
reserve a right that it did not own, and could not convey that nonexistent right to Evans. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE RESERVATION 
VIOLATED THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The trial court agreed with Utah County that Bird's reservation of the alleged 
easement failed to comply with the Statute of Frauds because it was too vague. (Aplt's 
Add. at 13-14.) Evans argues on appeal that the trial court erred because the decisions it 
relied on, Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, 977 P.2d 533, and Southland Corp. v. 
Potter, 760 P.2d 320 (Utah 1988), are distinguishable. (Aplt's Br. at 7-8.) 
"[A]n easement is an interest in land within the meaning of the statute of 
frauds...." Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779, 781 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). As such, "[a] binding contract can exist only where there has been 
mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms." 
Southland, 760 P.2d at 322. "One of the factors to consider in ascertaining the intent of 
the parties to an agreement purportedly transferring real property is whether the document 
sufficiently describes the interest granted ;in a manner sufficient to construe the 
instruments as a conveyance of an interest in land.'" Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781 
(quoting Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Utah 1970)). A 
8 
sufficient description is composed oi lour parts: "(I I I he grantor, (2) the grantee, ( 11 (lie 
interest granted, anu (4) ihs • '• '»vr i boundaries." Id. at 782 n.4. 
-*\rd s reservation ^ ..* - . ... :.iree pa / "f l "  : e: ^ "public use and i: igl lt-of-
wav over and into.Pine Street from the state hiv'iwav"'' (?) \\ reserves "a fifty-six foot 
wide right-of-way over and across' the proper!. ::u. , i - Bh cl to I Jtal I C :)i inty 
l iom P'ne Sn-1''1 u . ^ -i. . - ^ **u the ynwtor's remaining property", and t>» • purports to 
™
n ,<u. ilia! . ,s;: bounty Will _ i u .: 
A^*. ai A? > Although ih description of die alleged easement includes n^ width 
™irnose, it dot 
Ti_aU> the requirements of the Statute of l-raiids 
issue in Potter was a reservation made i a lomeyance ""Subject To A RighMM-W ; 
- • • 1 1 Apr ^ ^|10, 97? P.2d 5.<< I hus. like ihi mutant easement, the easemeni ai 
* M i r f 
however held that, "[although \ \ roears ?1P .* ^ mienueu ^ e.i u. express 
i • • -* * ioes not spec;t> 
the boundaries ol the easement or its exa* , ^ ^ language d<«*. ^ 
constitute ,1 definite and ascertainable description of the property." Id. a t f 11. 
5
 Apart from the vagaries assouuice MI:. ...-, a - ueu easement's description •;•. 
language Bird used to describe the type of easement he attempted to reserve is ,i 
unclear To the extent Bird's reservation of a "public use and right-of-wa> ' attempts io 
reserve an % • v-, " _ eic easement over" Pine Street, it is either improper 
nonjusticiable, first, Bird could not reserve something for itself that was owned by me 
public. Second, if a public easement had arisen in Pine Street, it still exists. Because the 
language conjoins "public use" with an undefined "right-of-way," Utah County assumed 
for the purposes of its argi inient below that the latter term was asserting -) private 
easement. (R. at 398). 
9 
Evans responds to this language by arguing that, unlike the alleged easement in 
Potter, the easement he alleges has specific boundaries and allows for its exact location to 
be fixed. (Apll's Br. at 7.) The minimal distinctions between the easement at issue in 
Potter and the easement alleged in this case do not cure the latter's defects. While Bird's 
reservation, unlike the Potter easement, specifies the width of the road to be built, it does 
not specify its length, a specification the Potter easement satisfied. Thus, far from being 
more specific than the Potter easement, Bird's easement is just as, if not more, vague. At 
least the Potter easement made some attempt to limit its width by describing it as a road; 
Bird's easement could conceivably traverse the length, as well as the width, of the 
transferred property.6 
To illustrate, the parcel Evans claims a right to cross under the Bird reservation is 
760 feet long and 120 feet wide. The unopened Pine Street right of way runs parallel to 
the entire length of this parcel. (Aplee's Add. at Al.) Thus, under Evans's interpretation 
of the reservation, he could assert a fifty-six-foot wide easement across any point over its 
entire 760-foot length. Under that theory, Evans could assert literally scores of different 
crossing points. 
Evans also contends that Potter is inapposite because the court "hung its ruling on 
the principle thatt a grantor may reserve an interest to itself, but not to a third party." 
(Aplt's Br. at 7.) While that was an issue in Potter, the court treated it separately from the 
sufficiency of the easement's description under the Statute of Frauds. After finding the 
conveyance insufficient as noted above, the court continued in Potter: "However, even if 
we were to assume that this language were sufficient to create an express easement, Utah 
6
 Unlike the parties in Potter, Utah County disputes that it ever intended to create the 
easement Bird attempted to reserve. (R. at 138, 259, 277-78, 391, 416-20, 476/45 & /46.) 
However, for the limited purposes of its argument below and on this appeal, it has 
assumed the easement was mutually approved. 
10 
law prohibits parties from expressly creating an easement in a 1:..... • ansaanm u ; me 
benefit of a third party who is not lixv olved in tl le transaction." Potte**. 1^ 99 U I A1 - 95, 
f 12, 977 P.2d 5 >3 (emphasis added) 1 1 IUS, tl le court first , conveya;.. c s 
description of the ea^emen* insufficient,, and then,, on separate grounds, found that the 
easement was also pn-miMu-. hecau.se it created a benefit for a third par t:y 
Therefore,, because the f^em^m be»^ meivlv describes " • » iift\-^\ toot wide n^ht-
of-way" between Pine Stree; anu isw^ . .V.UJJUIHL; pivpu,1. ,.:,.
 t • . . description 
of the length of the easement or «* ^af nomt n wmild cross over and impaei the Coinn "s 
land, it lacks a sufficient aesc
 r . ; i * a 
Statute of Frauds. See ?* ^ mr \i h'as^nwn^ and Licenses § 22 (1996) ("If the 
language of the instrument, in ngi e 
instrument, is so ambiguous that the court is un H * • irie intention of the parties, 
then Ihe grant - ill In, \uitl .iiimi mrllulihil " (Ibotinitc umiltnh) 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO FIX THE 
EASEMENT'S LOCATION. 
1953), jnd Salt Lake Or. /• cv H t haiKer -/r * <* r .y: Hi5 (utan 1953). th<it the 
tin ill I mill I in in ill I 1 I li in i HI ih ill nl ill Jiiii'iiishiiiiL!, Ihe Iwo cases, used them to support a 
decision to fix Ihe alleged easement's location. (Apll's LIr, al 4- ' ) I lie distinctions 
between those eases and the issue - rented here are, however, significant and 
substantive, 
1here is no indication in either Wood or Walker, I>u 'hat the Statute of Frauds 
defense was ever raised Indeed, there was no reason to rai^ . . ^u ^a^e because the 
existence of the easement was undisputed •<-• ^ai cases, <ome phvsical improvement 
denoted the easement's existence (\. '• •-.,• was ? ».i , , ^aikc?, ix a water 
conduit). The issue in each case was the easement's extent. The question presented in 
Wood was whether a right of way was general or restricted, and, if the latter, where it 
should be located. See Wood, 253 P.2d at 353. In Walker, Inc., the question was the 
width of a secondary floating or roving easement accompanying a water conduit. See 
Walker, Inc., 253 P.2d at 368-69. 
In Wood, a fence and gate allowed ingress and egress between the servient and 
dominant parcels. The court found that the fence and gate were "a practical construction 
of the deed by the parties" based on established use. See Wood, 253 P.2d at 352-54. In 
the present case, there is no physical improvement, no established use, and no 
construction of the easement by the parties. (R. at 138, 259, 277-78, 391, 416-20, 476/45 
&/46.) 
Evans compares Bird's reserved easement to the floating or roving easement at 
issue in Walker, Inc., asserting that the trial court should have located the easement on the 
western end of Pine Street, next to Highway 89 to avoid annulling or ruining "the grant to 
the Evans [sic]." (Aplt's Br. at 5-7.) The easement at issue in this case is not a floating 
or roving easement. Floating easements "are fixed and determined by the extents and 
limitations required for the proper use and enjoyment of the easement." Walker, Inc., 253 
P.2d at 369. Accordingly, the easement language itself usually identifies the easement's 
purpose, and makes no attempt to describe its boundaries. In Flying Diamond Oil Corp. 
v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989), the agreement at issue granted 
"the easements and rights to enter upon the described premises and to drill, 
construct, maintain and use upon, within, and over said premises all oil 
wells, gas wells, derricks, machinery, tanks, drips, boilers, engines, pipe, 
power and telephone lines, roadways, water wells ... and all other 
structures, [or] equipment ... necessary or convenient in prospecting and 
developing for, producing, storing, transporting, and marketing oil, gas, and 
associated liquid hydrocarbon substances under or produced from any 
portion of the described premises ...." 
12 
floating, and explained that floating easements 
are subject to definition by such unpredictable circumstances as the 
locations of wells, density of well locations, storage facilities, roads to well 
sites, and pipelines. The easements come into being as they become 
"necessary and convenient" for the activities *M prospecting lot and 
. producing, oil, gas, and liquid hydrocarbons which arc inuier the MirKi. -.- of 
the land in question 
1 ;. I id 626. 
The easement at issue in Walker. Inc. was similarly undefined, granting 
"a r )j way and easement for all reservoirs, dams, ditches, conduits, 
pole nii^s and appliances and utilities connected therewith to be constructed 
by the City wherever there may be located now or hereafter within lands 
o w ned by" the grantor in Section 25, T.2S., R IE , S.I ,.M. (Italics ours) 
Walker, Inc., 253 P.2d at 168 (quoting grant at issue), The court described this easement 
as "a 'roving easement," lIIIi.ill In the nature oi iuc -rant creating ,. ;ua >U.J; wsu. i AS 
was reasonably necessary for Ihc construction, use, repair, maintenance, replacement and 
reasonable enjoyment .it: conduit hi .it ><>M 
Bird's reserved easement does not approach these floating or roving descriptions. 
The purpose oi the eusemenl at issm in (Ins tasc r, nnl ilepeiulaiiil HI nnprcdu l.ihle 
circumstances like where oil deposits might be discovered or w here the County locates a 
lutlei coiidml Mislead il in an attempted express easement lliail ar.ufYinnil h ill VIII ities 
the boundaries and location of a single road "to provide access to grantor's remaining 
l a t i n ! I \ f » ! t i, > ' n l i ! .ill \ ' I 
Evans's assertion that "t: • < f ik parties and the most practical 
< onstnn hun til lllllllll(, ilei \\ \v\\\ " - I 
the state highway east onto Pine Street lor 56 feet to the eastern boundary i»! the 
13 
easement, then in a 56 foot strip south to Evans' property" is entirely without support. 
(Aplt's Br. at 6.) Evans has presented no evidence that Utah County even agreed to the 
easement, let alone intended to locate it fifty-six feet into Pine Street. Indeed, the county 
engineer's position at a public meeting was that the reservation was unilateral and had not 
been accepted by the County. (R. at 138.) Due to the prohibitive slopes that existed at 
the time Bird made the reservation, Utah County contends the only place it could have 
located the easement was along the unmaintained gravel road that crosses Pine Street 
approximately seventy-five feet east of the plat alignment of Columbia Avenue. (R. at 
212, 231, 233, 250-51, 255-56, 387-88, 416-17.) At the very least, Evans's interpretation 
demonstrates, like the easement's failure to sufficiently describe the easement, that there 
never has been mutual assent between the parties regarding the easement's location. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Judge Howard's decision finding Bird's attempted 
reservation of a private easement over Pine Street unenforceable because the easement 
never existed, the easement violated of the Statute of Frauds, and was too vague to allow 
him to fix its position should be upheld. 
DATED this 16th day of June, 2003. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Craig V. Wentz 
Barton H. Kunz II 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee 
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b t f o r e me J Km Knight , wot feein* by tw duly sworn, d i d say that 
he i s t h e v i c e Pres ident o f the Knight investment Company, a corp 
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EXHIBIT 
A-5 
p u b l i c ^ _ 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
OP 
I R. Lm BIRD COMPANYj a corporation organized and existing under the laws 
) of the State of Utah with its principal office at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to UTAH COUNTY, State of 
Utah, grantee, for the sum of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable 
consideration, the following tracts of land in Utah County, State of Utah ; 
All of lots 13 j 14 j )?, run! I1! in Block 6 of the Ironton Subdivision 
>I1 
; Plat A. 
\iotf0'
 A 1 1 o f l o t s n > j2, 19, 20 and 21 and the fractional parts of lots 
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 belonging to the grantor in Block 7 of the Ironton 
Subdivision Plat A. 
ALSO; Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Ironton Subdivision 
* 7^36?^a^ *, which point i s at the east end of the south line of Pine Street, 
1 { running thence South 32 Deg, 52. Min East 120 feet; thence South 57 Deg. 
08 Min, West 760 feet to State Highway; thence North 32 Deg, 52 Min. West 
along said highway 120 feet to South line of Pine Street; thence North 
57 Deg. 08 Min. East 760 feet to point of beginning. 
RESERVING to the grantor the public use and right-of-way over and 
into Pine Street from the State Highway and a 56 foot wide right-of-way 
over and across the last described parcel of land, from Pine Street to 
connect with the grantor's remaining property over which Utah County agrees 
to build a good gravel road within 90 days of the date of this instrument, 
to provide access to grantor's remaining land. 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the 
transfer represented thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly 
adopted by the board of directors of the grantor at a lawful meeting duly 
held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grant or has caused i t s corporate name and 
seal to be hereunto affixed by Its duly authorized officers this f£L day 
of July A.D. 1983. 
Attest: 
-m. £.-rt:. 
Secretary 
- ^ 
IcfcoVi&rat*/ .Steal) 
'ATR 0t .UTAH 
*^feoJin(t|r of Salt Laku 
R, L. BIRD COMPANY 
By ^o^d^^L^ 
_ President 
oC 
On the ^ 7 day of July, A.D, 1983 personally appeared bet 
Dorothy B. Hart and M. A. Bird who being by me duly sworn did say, each 
for himself, that she the said Dorothy B. Hart is the president,and he, 
the said M. A. Bird is the secretary of the R. L. Bird Company, and that 
the within and foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation 
by authority of a resolution of its board of directors and said Dorothy B, 
Hart and M. A. Bird each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same and t hat the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation. 
w M y ° 4 ^ commision expires October 28, 1985 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
